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No. 10512 
RESPONDENT'S BRrEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents are of the opinion that the Statement of Facts 
as related by the defendants is incomplete and unilateral and in 
order for the Court to have before it all of the facts, we will relate 
them as follows: 
Plaintiffs, prior to July 31, 1962, were engaged in construct-
ing two houses on property owned by them in Riverdale, Weber 
County, Utah. The real property is described in the plaintiffs' 
Exhibit A and involves Lots 7 and 8, Rainbow Subdivision in 
Weber County, Utah, together with a piece of adjoining unsub-
divided property. 
Plaintiffs, as builders, employed a licensed contractor, Law-
rence Lutz, to do the carpentry work and some of the cement work 
on the houses to be built on Lots 7 and 8, (T. 31, 22) and to 
supervise the other employees and their work (T. 30, 31). They 
also employed licensed contractors to do the cement work, (T. 29) 
electrical work (T. 117), plumbing and heating (T. 27, 117), and 
the roofing (T. 116). 
Defendant Darlene 0. Openshaw became interested in pur· 
chasing the two homes together with the adjacent vacant prop· 
erty and on several occasions went through the two homes while 
they were in various stages of construction and apparently was 
satisfied with what she saw (T. 75). Upon the completion of the 
houses on Lots 7 and 8, and on July 31, 1962, the plaintiffs and 
defendants had Attorney Dale T. Browning prepare a Uniform 
Real Estate Contract, (plaintiffs' Exhibit A) covering the sale 
of the above referred to real property. The deeds to the real 
property were placed in escrow with Franklin D. Maughan, an 
abstracter of Ogden, Utah (Plaintiffs' Exhibits Band C). Defend· 
ants entered into possession of the property, rented the upstairs of 
one home for $150.00 a month and the other home was rented for a 
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total of $255.00 (T. 48). Defendants made the payments pursuant 
to said contract until a balance of $4,379.32 was left remaining. 
Although the contract provided that the total property would 
not be released to the defendants until the entire purchase price 
was paid in full, the defendant, Darlene 0. Openshaw, on Octo-
ber 22, 1964, informed Mr. Maughan, the escrow agent, that the 
final payment had been made and requested that the deeds be 
delivered to her. This statement was false, there being approxi-
mately $4,379.32 still owing. However, the escrow agent had the 
deed recorded in the defendants' name (T. 96, 81). Suit was filed 
March 17, 1965, seeking a re-conveyance of the property until the 
contract was completed or for the sum owing. 
DISPOSITION OF TIIE TRIAL COURT 
At the conclusion of the parties' evidence the jury viewed the 
premises and inspected the houses and the cause was submitted 
to the jury on special interrogatories, Special Interrogatory No. 
9 reading as follows: "I. Do you find it proven by clear and 
convincing evidence that the plaintiff perpetrated a fraud upon 
the defendants as the term 'fraud' is here used in these instructions?" 
To this interrogatory, the jury answered "no", and pursuant thereto 
the Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs as prayed 
for together with costs, interest and attorney's fees. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. TIIERE WERE NO IMPLIED WARRANTIES 
IN REGARD TO TIIE HOUSES; THE HOUSES WERE BUILT 
IN A WORKMANLIKE MANNER AND SUITABLE FOR 
HABITATION; THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE 
BUILDER-VENDOR DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE 
BUILDING CODE OF THE AREA IN WHICH THE STRUC-
TURES ARE LOCATED. 
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It is strongly urged by the defendants-appellants that there 
was a breach of warranty on the part of the plaintiffs-respondents 
in the construction of the homes and the sale of the real estate. 
The Court's attention is called to paragraph 20 of the Unifonn 
Real Estate Contract entered into between the parties and which 
is idenified as plaintiffs' Exhibit A, which reads as follows: "It 
is hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto 
that the buyer accepts the said property in its present condition 
and that there are no representations, covenants or agreements 
between the parties hereto with reference to said property, except 
as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto." 
Th.e ruling of the Court is correct as is shown in Jensen's Used 
Cars vs. Rice (Utah) 7 Ut. 276, 323 P. 259, 260. 
"Elementary it is that in construing contracts we seek 
to determine the intention of the parties, but it is also ele· 
mentary and of extreme practical importance that we hold 
contracting parties to their clear and understandable Ian· 
guage deliberately committed in writing and endorsed by 
them as signatories thereto. Were this not so, business, one 
with another, among our citizens would be relegated to the 
chaotic and the basic purpose of the law to supply enforce· 
able rules of conduct for the maintenance and improvement 
of an orderly society, welfare and progress would find itself 
impotent. It is not unreasonable to hold one responsible for 
language for which he himself espouses. Such language is 
the only implement he gives us to fashion a determination 
as to the intentions of the parties. Under such circumstances 
we should not be required to embosom any request that we 
ignore that very language. This is as it should be. The rule 
excluding matters outside the four corners of a clear and 
understandable document is a fair one and one's conten· 
tions concerning his intent should extend no further than 
his own clear expression. 
"It is urged correctly that to admit matters outside .a 
contract would do violence with the principles that one is 
bound by his manifestations of assent and that irrespective 
of such contentions such matters properly are excludable by 
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the parole evidence rule, which rule counsel suggests is one 
of substantive law rather than one of evidence. Whatever 
kind one calls it, the rule that excludes such evidence is a 
common-sense rule." 
In the case of Steiber vs. Palumbo 347 P. 2d 978 (Ore.), the 
defendant sold a completed home to the plaintiff. Plaintiff claimed 
a breach of warranty because of lack of proper footings under the 
house. In the consummation of the transaction only three papers 
were employed, an earnest money receipt, a deed and a mortgage. 
None of the three papers contained any warranty of the quality 
of the house or the character of the soil under it. The Court af-
firmed the lower Court which had previously stated: "There is 
no such thing as an implied warranty in connection with the sale 
of real estate". And the Supreme Court stated: "No decision has 
come to our attention which permitted recovery by the vendee 
of housing upon a theory of implied warranty". In doing so, they 
cited Williston on Contracts, Revised Edition, Section 926: "One 
who contracts to buy real estate may indeed refuse to complete 
the transaction if the vendor's title is bad, but one who accepts a 
deed generally has no remedy for defective title, except such as 
the covenants in his deed may give him. Therefore, if there are 
no covenants he has no redress, though he gets no title. Still more 
clearly, there can be no warranty of quality or condition implied 
in the sale of real estate. 
"It is generally true also that any express agreements in re-
gard to land contained in a contract to sell it are merg;ed in the 
deed if the purchaser accepts a conveyance." 
Further quoting from Levy vs. C. Young Construction Co., 
1958 26 N.J. 300, 139 Atlantic 2d, 738: 
"Absent any covenant binding defendant to sell a well con-
structed house, plaintiffs cannot sue upon an implied war-
ranty * * * * 
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"As defendant notes, the policy reasons underlying the rule 
that the acceptance of a deed without covenants as to con-
~truction is the cut-off point so far as the vendor's liability 
is concerned are rather obvious. Were plaintiffs successful 
under the facts presented to us, an element of uncertainty 
would pervade the entire field. Real estate transactions 
would become chaotic if vendors were subjected to liability 
after they had parted with the ownership and control of the 
premises. They could never be certain as to the limits or ! 
termination of their liability. The rule which we impose in 
the circumstances of the present action works no harshness 
on purchasers of real estate. Plaintiffs had an opportunity to 
protect themselves by extracting warranties or guaranties 
from the defendant in the contract of sale and by reserving i 
them in the deed * * * " 
In Harmon National Real Estate Corporation vs. Eagan 241 
N.Y. Supplement 708, 709, suit was brought by a mortgagee and 
the defendant mortgagor counter-claimed on the ground "That 
at the time the house was sold to the defendant the plaintiff well 
knew that the same was uninhabitable." The Court said: 
"For after the contract of sale has been executed and the 
conveyance accepted, the Grantee must rely solely on the 1 
covenants in his deed. If his deed contains no covenants he 
is without a remedy, either for eviction or encumbrance. 
Upon the sale of real property, the rule caveat emptor ap- 1 
plies * * * no implied covenant arises from a conveyance of 
real property." 
In the case of Kerr vs. Parsons, 1948, 83 Ohio App. 204, 82 
N.E. Second 303, 305, the action was based upon the plaintiffs 
purchase of a second-hand house; after purchase he brought an 
action for damages against the Seller on the ground that the latter 
had falsely represented that a well on the premises would supply 
enough water for household uses. A verdict and judgment for the i 
defendant were reversed because of prejudicial instuctions. Inter 
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alia it was noted that the trial court had charged as to warranty. 
In reversing the appellate Court said: 
"Ordinarily there is no implied warranty as to the condition 
of real estate sold or leased and oral evidence of a warranty 
would not be admissible to add to a deed or lease." 
In the case of Berger vs. Burkoff 1952, 200 Maryland 561, 
92 At. 2d, 376, 378, the action was based on the claim that the 
basement in a new home was improperly waterproofed. It was 
the contention of the appellants that there was an implied war-
ranty not expressed to furnish a structurally satisfactory house. 
The Court held there were no implied warranties in the sale of 
real estate. To the same effect, see the New York case of Dolezel 
vs. Fialkoff, 2 At. 2d 642, 151 N.Y. Sup. Second 734. 
Although Oregon has a statute stating specifically that there 
are no implied warranties, the Oregon case previously cited of 
Steiber vs. Palumbo concluded as follows: "It will be noticed from 
the foregoing that even apart from legislations such as 0.R.S. 
93.140, the law refuses to imply in favor of the purchaser of an 
existing house warranties as to quality. As to purchasers of that 
kind, the rule of caveat emptor applies and he must reduce his 
purported warranties to written contractual form if he expects to 
base an action upon them." 
For further citations in regard to this proposition, see 78 
A.L.R., 2, 446. 
Defendants-appellants cite three main cases in support of 
their theory. In Carpenter vs. Donohoe 338 P. 2d 399 (Colo.) 
and /ones vs. Gatewood 381 P 2d 158 (Okla.), both cases deal 
with "hazardous" condition or conditions that make the houses 
not fit for habitation. The Carpenter case dealt with walls caving 
in that made living in the house hazardous and the Jones case 
concerned itself with water seeping through the concrete slab 
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that made the house unlivable. These cases are therefore distin. ' 
guishable from the case at bar for the reason that the houses have 
been occupied continuously since possession by defendants either 
by defendants themselves or by others who pay well for the 
privilege. 
The third case relied upon, Schipper vs. Leavitt & Sons, Inc., 
207 A. 2 314 is a purely tort case and has no application to the 
case at bar. 
It is difficult to see how it can seriously be contended that 
the _houses were not suitable for habitation inasmuch as the up-
stairs of the white house was rented for $150.00 per month and 
the brown house for a total of $255.00 (T. 48) and at the present , 
time the defendants-appellants are residing in the white house 
(T. 38). 
In rcegard to the workmanship on the homes and the quality 
of lumber used therein, Mr. Lutz, defendants' witness, stated that 
the carpentry work was satisfactory, (T. 24) and that the lumber 
was strong enough, (T. 36). Harvey Hill, defendants' witness, stated 
that the lumber used was satisfactory if the spanning was proper, 
(T. 63) but that he did not know whether or not the require- l 
ments for proper spanning had been complied with (T. 69). There 
was other evidence from another licensed contractor that the 
materials that went into the houses made for good construction 1 
(T. 162). 
Concerning the furnace, there was absolutely no testimony 
as to whether or not the furnace was ventilated properly, but there 
was testimony that the furnace was installed by a licensed heat-
ing contractor (T. 27, 117). 
The electrical work was done by a licensed electrical con-
tractor and not by the plaintiffs-respondents (T. 117). 
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Plaintiffs-respondents deny that there was any express war-
ranty that the roofs were "20 year roofs" (T. 116) and defendants-
appellants' witness, Harvey Hill, stated that he did not know for 
a fact that the roofs were not what are called "20 year roofs" 
(T. 68). 
Alhough there was testimony that the houses were at least 
partially insulated plaintiffs-respondents deny that there was any 
representation whatsoever made as to whether or not the houses 
were fully insulated (T. 116). 
The construction loan was obtained through State Savings 
& Loan Company of Salt Lake City and several inspections were 
made by representatives of State Savings & Loan Company prior 
to releasing the construction money (T. 149). 
Although defendants-appellants, over objection, introduced 
zoning ordinances, building codes and electrical codes, there was 
no evidence whatsoever that the structures in question did not 
comply with the zoning ordinance, the building codes or electrical 
codes. 
POINT 2. DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS SHOULD BE 
BOUND BY THE CONTRACT THAT THEY EXECUTED. 
Defendants-appellants' point 2 would appear to be beyond 
argument inasmuch as there is ample evidence from defendants' 
witnesses as well as plaintiffs' that if there were in fact any im-
plied warranties, that they were not breached. There seems to 
he more than ample evidence to support the jury's vedict. 
In raising the point, defendants-appellants presume that the 
only reason that they did not prevail was because of the para-
graph 20 in the Uniform Contract which stated that there were 
no waranties either expess or implied-this is not so--defendants-
appellants did not prevail because they failed to convince the jury, 
rither from evidence or a careful view and inspection of the prem-
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ises that the houses were poorly constructed, of defective mate-
rials, or were not fit for human habitation. 
However, it is the established law in this state that contract-
ing parties, not acting under disabilities shall be bound by the · 
terms of their contracts. 
Jensen's Used Cars vs. Rice, 7 Ut. 2 276, 323 P. 2d 259. 
In addition to the express provisions of the contract, defend-
ants-appellants obtained deeds of Warranty which contained no · 
covenants or restricti:ons. This was the second chance defendants· 
appellants had to protect themselves if they were concerned, which 
they were not. After the deed was accepted, defendants-appellants 
could rely only on the covenants in the deed and there werie none 
in regard to the items of which they complain. See Harmon Na-' 
tional Real Estate Corp. vs. Egan 241 N.Y. Sup. 708, 709. Steiber 
vs. Palumbo, Supra., Levy vs. C. Young Const. Co., Supra. 
It wasn't until three years later, after suit was instituted for 
final payment or return of the deed that the alleged defocts were 
brought to light. Defendants-appellants are guilty of !aches ii 
there is any merit to their complaints. Section 60-3-9, Utah Code 
Ann. 1953 provides as follows: 
"But if, after acceptance of the goods, the buyer fails to give 
notice to the seller of the breach of any promise or warranty 
within a reasonable time after the buyer knows, or ought to , 
know, of such breach, the seller shall not be liable therefor." 
Inasmuch as there were no warranties contained in the Uni· 
form Real Estate Contract, plaintiffs-respondents' Exhibit A, nor 
were there any reservations contained in the Deed issued pursuant 
to said contract, plaintiffs-appellants' Exhibits B and C, there were 
no warranties implied or expressed, therefore they could not be 
breached and the defendants-appellants have given no reason why 
they should not be held to their contract. Jensen's Used Cars vs 
10 
Rice 7 Ut. 2d, 276, 323 P. 2d, 259, 260; Harmon National Real 
Estate Corporation vs. Eagan, 241 N.Y. Sup. 708, 709, Levy vs. C. 
Young Const. Co., Supa. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence shows that the houses were well constructed 
with good materials and good workmanship; that they were fit 
for habitation; that there were no warranties expressed or implied 
and no breaches thereof and that defendants-appellants should 
be held to their contract and the verdict of the jury affirmed by 
this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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GEORGE B, HANDY 
521 Eccles Building 
Ogden, Utah 
